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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Article VIII, section 
3 of the Utah Constitution, and Utah Code Ann. 35-1-1 et seq. and 63-46b-l et seq. Peitioner 
seeks relief from a Default Judgment entered against it on March 20, 1992. This is an appeal 
from a final order of the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah issued by Administrative 
Law Judge, Donald L. George, on the 19th day of October, 1992. Subsequently, Petitioner 
timely filed its Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission. An Order denying 
Petitioner's Motion for Review was entered on the 6th day of January, 1993, by the Industrial 
Commission. Neither Petitioner nor its counsel, the undersigned, received notification of the 
Commission's Order denying Petitioner's Motion for Review. Therefore, Petitioner filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration on the 8th day of April, 1993. Such Motion for Reconsideration 
was not acted upon in a timely manner by the Commission and, therefore, was deemed denied. 
On the 2nd day of June, 1993, Petitioner filed a Writ of Review with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Do the actions of Petitioner, giving rise to the entry of Default Judgment against it, 
constitute excusable neglect, mistake and in part because of misrepresentation by 
Applicant, such that equity requires the Default Judgment be set aside? 
II. Was there sufficient evidence before the Industrial Commission in order to arrive at its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law? Was the award granted by the Industrial 
Commission reasonable based on the evidence before it? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Proceeding. This is an appeal from the decision of the Industrial Commission 
rendered by Administrative Law Judge, Donald L. George, on October 19, 1992, (Case 
No. 91-1181) wherein Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered. 
Previsouly a Default Judgment had been entered against the Petitioner, Pipe Specialty, 
Inc., on or about March 20, 1992. Subsequent Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
found that the Applicant, Salvador D. Montoya, was injured while working for 
Petitioner. The medical bills for the treatment rendered to Applicant included $432.25 
to the Bannock Regional Medical Center in Pocatello, Idaho, and $503.00 to Dr. Davis, 
a physician in Las Cruces, New Mexico. Further, it was determined that the Applicant 
was working an average of 55 hours per week and earning in excess of $11 per hour, 
being married and supporting a dependant child. Further, the Applicant was deemed 
temporarily totally disabled from the date of the accident, October 2, 1991, through and 
including January 3, 1992. Therefore, Applicant was awarded $5,706.01 for the 
temporary total disability. Further, Petitioner was ordered to pay the attorney's fees of 
the Uninsured Employers Fund for an additional amount of $520.00. Such judgment 
amounts include interest at 8 percent per annum beginning January 3, 1992. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated. (1953 as amended) Section 35-1-1 et seq. 
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Utah Code Annotated. (1953 as amended) Section 63-46(b)-l et seq. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about October 1, 1991, while in the employ of Pipe Specialty, Inc., Applicant, 
Salvador D. Montoya, allegedly suffered an industrial accident wherein a small bone in the great 
left toe was fractured. The accident occurred at the work site of Petitioner, Pipe Specialty, at 
or near Pocatello, Idaho. The Applicant incurred emergency medical expenses in the amount 
of $432.25 from the care provided at the Bannock Regional Medical Center at or near Pocatello, 
Idaho. Subsequently, Applicant incurred medical expenses from a physician in Las Cruces, New 
Mexico, of $503.00. The alleged accident of the Applicant occurred as the Petitioner was 
completing its job in the Pocatello, Idaho, area. Subsequently, Petitioner's work was sporadic 
throughout the remainder of 1991 and 1992. Though Applicant was temporarily disabled 
because of the accident, Petitioner was unable to employ him or other employees during the 
entire period of Applicant's temporary disablement. 
Shortly after the accident, on or about October 22, Applicant filed a Petition for Hearing 
seeking workers compensation benefits to be paid by Petitioner. Sometime in 1992, it was 
communicated to Petitioner by the Applicant that Applicant no longer wished to pursue any 
claim against Petitioner for workers compensation benefits. In the first part of 1992, Petitioner 
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continued to employ the Applicant in its various work projects throughout Utah and New 
Mexico. 
Because of the numerous representations made by Applicant to Petitioner, Petitioner did 
not respond to Applicant's Application ana i^d not advise counsel of any pending administrative 
action. On or about March 20, 1992, unbeknownst to Petitioner a Default was entered against 
Petitioner for failing to timely respond to the Application of the Applicant for workers 
compensation benefits. Plaintiff did not receive any Notice of such Default. The subsequ it 
Notice that Petitioner received from the Industrial Commission was that of a Notice of 
Cancellation of the Hearing sought by Applicant. Such Notice of Cancellation was dated April 
2, 1992. 
Other than the initial Application for workers compensation benefits, Petitioner, Pipe 
Specialty, never received any Notice or communication from the Industrial Commission. 
Concurrently, Petitioner was involved in another matter pending before the Industrial 
Commission and was represented by counsel. After Petitioner's Default was entered, a hearing 
was held (on October 15, 1992) wherein the merits of the Applicant's claims were considered. 
The Industrial Commission, based on Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered into by 
Administrative Law Judge Donald L. George, ordered that Petitioner, Pipe Specialty, pay to the 
Applicant any and all medical expenses, in excess of $935.00, together with unpaid temporary 
total compensation in the amount of $5,706, together with interest accruing at a rate of 8 percent 
per annum. Thereafter, the award entered against Petitioner was augmented in an amount of 
$520.00 for attorney's fees incurred by the Uninsured Employers Fund, having appeared through 
its counsel, Thomas C. Sturdy. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner, Pipe Specialty, Inc., should be entitled to the equitable relief of having the 
Default Judgment against it set aside. Petitioner was led to believe by the Applicant that the 
Application for workers compensation benefits for the accident that occurred on or about 
October 1, 1991, was no longer being pursued by Applicant. Though Petitioner did receive the 
initial Application for such benefits, it received no other additional notices or communication 
from the Industrial Commission concerning any pending action, including hearings regarding the 
merits of Applicant's claims. 
Further, Petitioner's neglect is further excused and its arguments for equitable relief 
strengthened by its receipt of a Notice of Cancellation of Hearing from the Commission. 
Because the Applicant misled Petitioner into believing that the Application for workers 
compensation benefits was withdrawn, he caused the Petitioner to be taken off notice of any 
pending administrative action. Further, Petition continued to employ Applicant through and 
including the first part of 1992 in the location of Applicant's home town, Las Cruces, New 
Mexico. 
Notwithstanding the valid arguments by Petitioner in seeking a review on the merits, the 
Industrial Commission conducted a hearing via telephone wherein it arrived at the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law which were not supported by a sufficient factual record. 
Specifically, the Commission relied on hearsay testimony as to the number of hours worked on 
the average by Applicant (being in excess of 55 hours per week). Such finding constituted the 
majority of the judgment award against Petitioner. 
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ARGUMENT 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Factual Determinations Must Be Supported by the Evidence 
As with Reviews of other Administrative Agencies, this court gives deference to facts 
determined by the Agency at the hearing level if they are supported by the evidence. Where 
they are not supported, no such deference is given. In Hurst v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission. 723 P.2d 416, 419 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court described this 
deference. "On questions of fact, the Commission's Findings are conclusive and not subject to 
review by this court unless they are without substantial support in the record and thus clearly 
arbitrary and capricious." The Findings of the Agency are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. "The Findings are clearly erroneous only if they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the Appellat Court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made." State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Further, the Findings of 
Fact must be supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court. See Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah 1989). 
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POINT I 
BECAUSE OF EXCUSABLE NEGLECT AND MISREPRESENTATION, 
EQUITY JUSTIFIES PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR RELIEF FROM THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST IT, 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to relieve a party 
from a judgment for reasons including but not limited to: "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise 
or excusable neglect; ... (3) fraud, whether heretofore denominated, intrinsic or extrinsic, 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; ... or (7) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment." Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
As is apparent from the above facts and substantiated by the Affidavit of Petitioner's 
President, Mr. Ron Bingham, Petitioner's actions rise to the level of excusable neglect and that 
Petitioner has been a victim of misrepresentation by Applicant. 
The position of the Utah Supreme Court on Rule 60(b) motions is clearly anti-default. 
In the case of Helgesen v. Inyangumia. 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981), the court reversed the 
district court's denial to set aside a Default Judgment stating: 
The decision to relieve a party from a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) is 
subject to discretion of the trial court. But discretion should be exercised in 
furtherance of justice and should incline towards granting relief in a doubtful 
case to the end that the party may have a hearing. We reiterated in May hew v. 
Standard Gilsonite Co.. 376 P.2d 951 (Utah 1962) that it is quite uniformly 
regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a Default Judgment 
where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the Defendant's failure to 
appear, and timely application is made to set it aside. 336 P.2d 1081 (emphasis 
added). 
The alleged industrial accident incurred on or about October 1, 1991, Petitioner's work 
in the Pocatello, Idaho, area was nearly completed when the accident occurred. On or about 
October 22, 1992, the Applicant after returning to Salt Lake Cit after completion of the job in 
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Pocatello, filed for workers compensation benefits with the Industrial Commission. During the 
remaining time of 1991, Petitioner had little or no work in which to provide its employees. 
Shortly before Christmas, Applicant returned to his home in Las Cruces, New MeAico, where 
for the first time subsequent to the initial health care treatment provided at the Bannock Regional 
Medical Center in Pocatello, Idaho, Applicant sought the medical assistance of Dr. Alan Davis. 
(See Affidavit of Petitioner's President, Ron Bingham, at page £ .) 
Shortly after the first consultation with the Applicant, Dr. Davis allowed for and certified 
Applicant able to return to work. However, in the first part of 1992 the work of Petitioner was 
sporadic. In January 1992, once Petitioner had procurred work for its employees, Applicant 
communicated to Petitioner that he was withdrawing his Application for workers compensation 
benefits and wished to drop the entire matter. (See Affidavit of Bingham at page Qj .) 
However, the record created by the Industrial Commission at its October 10, 1992, hearing, 
wherein Petitioner was not present nor represented, assumes that Applicant returned home 
immediately after the accident to receive continued treatment from Dr. Alan C. Davis. In 
reality, Dr. Davis had very few consultation periods with the Applicant and failed to even 
provide a impairment rating based on the alleged injury of Applicant. 
Petitioner, during the first part of 1992, was involved in other pending administrative 
action before the Industrial Commission. However, because of the communications from 
Applicant to Petitioner and the reliance of Petitioner on such communications, no appearance 
of counsel was entered nor was any responsive pleading filed with the Industrial Commission. 
Having received no additional notification of any pending action, Petitioner assumed that the 
communication received by Applicant was accurate and correct. Such understanding wv.s 
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substantiated by Petitioner's receipt of a Notice of Cancellation of a Hearing dated April 2, 
1992. Shortly before that Notice was received unbeknownst to Petitioner, its Deault was entered 
on or about March 20, 1992, for having failed to respond to the Application of the Applicant 
within the time required under the rules of the Industrial Commission. 
It is patently unfair and prejudicial to Petitioner to not have the opportunity to fully 
respond to the allegations set forth in Applicant's Application and to have a full and complete 
hearing on the merits of such Application. Because of misrepresentation by Applicant to 
Petitioner and the receipt, coincidentally, of a Notice of a Cancelled Hearing received by 
Petitioner, Petitioner's failure to timely respond constitutes mistake, inadvertence, and/or 
excusable neglect. Equity demands that Petitioner be entitled to respond fully to the Applicant's 
Application and to have the Default Judgment entered against Petitioner set aside. Further, 
Petitioner is entitled to a hearing on the merits. 
POINT H 
THE EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
IN ARRIVING AT ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW WAS HEARSAY AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
Because Petitioner was unaware of any hearing and any pending administrative action, 
a Default Judgment was entered against Petitioner. Petitioner was not present at the October 10, 
1992, hearing wherein evidence was gathered and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
were entered by the Administrative Law Judge. The majority of the evidence taken and, as 
reflected in the transcript, was done so via telephone without the Applicant having been sworn 
to the testimony that was provided (Tr. 9 L. 14). 
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Further, Applicant did not submit any records to substantiate the claims of weekly work 
averages in excess of 55 hours. To the contrary, the records of Petitioner support a much lower 
weekly average, or approximately 23-30 hours per week. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner is entitled to the equitable relief it seeks, namely a 
setting aside of the Default Judgment and an opportunity to be heard at a hearing. Further, the 
Findings of the Industrial Commission are erroneous and against the clear weight of the evidence 
presented. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to have the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order of the Administrative Law Judge set aside or modified. 
Respectfully submitted this *3Q—day of January, 1994. 
l^J^HAo 
J A I ^ S j T L W p 7 ^ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
O&.J 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed or hand delivered, forfr true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner to the attorneys and parties at the addresses listed below, on 
the X)M- day of January, 1994. 
SALVADOR D. MONTOYA 
4362 Highway 28 South 
Las Cruces, NM 84065 
SHARON J. EBLEN, ESQ. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
JA^ES J. LUKfo, 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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ADDENDA 
JAMES J. LUND 
2304 S. Berkeley Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Telephone: (801) 466-2210 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PIPE SPECIALTY, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Petitioner, 
AFFIDAVIT of RON BINGHAM, 
President of Petitioner, 
Pipe Specialty, Inc. 
-vs.-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH and 
SALVADOR MONTOYA, 
Respondents 
Case No. 930353-CA 
County of J^f/2fc^z^e-
State of //{J%^7 
The Affiant sayeth: 
1. I am President of Pipe Specialty, Inc., a Utah corporation, and have been 
since its inception. 
2. I am familiar with the day-to-day operations concerning Pipe Specialty. 
3. On or about October 1, 1991, I was directing a crew of workers in and around 
the Pocatello, Idaho, area. 
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4. During that time, it is alleged that the Applicant, Salvador D. Montoya, 
injured his large left toe while working. 
5. Applicant was directed to receive treatment at the Bannock Regional Medical 
Center in Pocatello, Idaho. At that point, we were nearly finished with the job 
there in Idaho. 
6. Our crews returned to Salt Lake City towards the middle of October 1991, and 
we had ittle if no work the remaining portion of 1991. In 1992, our work 
was sporadic, but in a greater volume than the last part of 1991. I was aware 
that Applicant had filed an Application with the Industrial Commission seeking 
workers compensation benefits for the injury he sustained October 1, 1991. 
7. On several occasions in the beginning part of the year 1992, Applicant 
indicated and communicated to me that he no longer wished to pursue the 
workers compensation claims with the Industrial Commission against Pipe 
Specialty. 
8. Applicant continued to work on the crews that we had in the state of Utah and 
including the state of New Mexico. 
9. The number of hours worked by Applicant in 1991 did not average 55 hours 
per week. There may have been a few weeks in which such number of hours 
were worked; however, the average was approximately 25-30 at most. 
10. In addition to Applicant communicating to me that he no longer wished to 
pursue his claims for workers compensation benefits, our office was in receipt 
of a Notice of a Cancelled Hearing which further led me to believe that there 
was no pending administrative action at the Industrial Commission. 
11. Because of the foregoing, I did not communicate any information concerning 
any pending action to legal counsel who was and currently is representing Pipe 
Specialty in various matters, including those before the Industrial Commission. 
DATED this £ / day of February, 1994. 
Affiant, Ron Bingham, 
President of Pipe Specialty, Inc. 
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JURAT 
Ron Bingham appeared before me on the day of February, 1994, and did swear 
to me that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, the foregoing is true and 
accurate. 
DATED THIS 9J day of February, 1994. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CAROL GOLLINC^ 
5480 South 4420 West 
Kearns, Utah$4«,i8 
My CcKnrrussion Expims 1/7/M 
STATF OF UTAH 
I 
I 
I 
J 
Notary Public T 
Residing at: 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 91-1181 
SALVADOR D- MONTOYA, * 
* BINDINGS OF FACT 
Applicant, * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
* AND ORDER 
vs. * 
PIPE SPECIALTIES, INC. * Judge Doriald L. George 
(uninsured) . * 
Defendant. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Donald 
L. George, one of the Administrative Law Judges of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah on October 15, 1992 on the application of 
Salvador Montoya for an award of temporary total compensation and 
payment of medical expenses incurred as the result of an indus-
trial accident. The applicant was present by telephone from his 
home in New Mexico. The default of the defendant, Pipe Special-
ties, Inc., was issued on March 20, 1992 for failure to respond 
to the application within the time required by the rules of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. The Uninsured Employers' Fund 
appeared through its counsel, Thomas C. Sturdy. The applicant 
testified on his behalf and the medical records pertinent to Mr. 
Montoya's injuries were admitted in evidence. Based upon that 
testimony and evidence, the Industrial Commission of Utah now 
makes the following: 
/V 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On October 1, 1991, while pursuing the business of his 
employer, defendant Pipe Specialties, Iiic., a Utah corporation, 
the applicant suffered an industrial accident when a jig holding 
a large section of pipe broke and dropped the pipe on Mr. 
Montoya's foot, fracturing the proximal phalanx of the left great 
toe. The accident: occurred near Pocate.lio, Idaho. Mr* Montoya 
had worked for Pipe Specialties within Vhe State of Utah within 
the previous six months. 
The Bannock Memorial Medical Cent'-*-, Pocatello, Idaho, and 
Alan C. Davis, M.D., Las Cruces, New M ;;ic:o, treated Mr. 
MonLoya's injury. The medical bills are: $432.25 owirrf to the 
Bannock Regional Medical Center and $503.00 owing to Dr. Davis. 
At the tima of the accident, Mr. Kontcya was working an 
average of 55 hours per week and earning^JUxui_pi?x_Jlour. He was 
married and had one child who was dependent on him for support. 
Mr. Montoya was totally disabled from the qav of the acci-
dent until Dr. Davis released him to return to work on January 3, 
1992. 
Pipe Specialties, Inc. had no workeir's compensation insur-
ance at the time of Mr. Montoya's accident. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The applicant sustained a compensable industrial accident on 
October 1, 1992, while employed by defendant Pj.pe Specialties, 
Inc., when a large section of pipe dropped on his foot and 
fractured the proximal phalanx of the left great toe. 
The defendant is liable for Applicant's mediical expenses 
reasonably related to the industrial injury. 
The applicant is entitled to temporary2total^isabi 1 ity 
compensation benefits for the period from October 2] 1991 to 
January'3, 1992 when he was released to return to work by his 
treating physician. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Pipe Specialties, Inc. shall pay 
all medical expenses incurred by the applicant <\s the result of 
the industrial accident including, but not limited to, $432.25 
owing to the Bannock Regional Medical Center, and $503.00 owing 
to Dr. Alan C. Davis. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Pipe Specialties, Inc., 
pay to Salvador Montoya temporary total compensation at the rate 
of $378.00 per week for 13.4286 weeks for a total of $5,706.01 
for temporary total disability from October 2, 1991 through 
January 3, 1992. These benefits are accrued and shall be paid in 
a lump sum with interest of 8% per annum commencing January 3, 
1992. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the applicant shall be entitled 
to recover all attorneys fees and costs incurred in collecting 
this award from Pipe Specialties, Inc., pursuant to UCA §35-1-59. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Pipe Specialties, Inc., 
becomes or is insolvent, appoints or has appointed a receiver, or 
otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or 
other security to pay the amounts required to be paid by this 
Order, the compensation and benefits shall be paid by the Unin-
sured Employers' Fund in accordance with the Medical and Surgical 
Fee Schedule of the Commission. In the event of payment by the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund, it shall be subrogated to all of the 
rights of the applicant to collect the sums due and owing by Pipe 
Specialties, Inc., pursuant to UCA §35-1-107. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of 
the date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and 
not subject to review or appeal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
V 
^ 
/Y^ C IA. si. 
Obi* 
Donald L. George 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
/f&ts day of October, 1992. 
ATTEST: 
P a t r i c i a O. Ash 
Commission S e c r e t ra ry 
Ul/04/89 01:b3 8012544493 P.S.I. PAGE 09 
Wc. If "»• 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH 
Case Nvsaber 91O011&1 
Salvador D* Montoya, * 
• 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
* 
Pipe Specialties, Inc. * 
(uninsured), * 
* 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah ("commission11) issues this 
order pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-78 and Section 
63-46b-12. 
On November 19, 1992, Pipe Specialties, Inc. ("respondent11) 
timely filed a motion for review of the Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law and Order entered by an administrative law judge 
("ALJ") of the commission in the above captioned matter on October 
19, 1992. 
The respondent requests that the commission grant a hearing 
and review the merits of the applicant's claim. The respondent's 
request is based upon its claim that it received no notice of the 
pending action following the Notice of Cancellation of Hearing 
dated April 2, 1992. 
Review of the record in this matter shows that the respondent 
received notice of the following: (1) Application for Hearing by 
certified letter dated January 30, 1992; (2) Notice of Hearing 
dated March 19, 1992; (3) Default Order for failure of respondents 
to file an answer to the application for hearing dated March 20, 
1992; (4) Interrogatories to Applicant dated March 31, 1992; (5) 
Notice of Cancellation of Hearing dated April 2, 1992; (6) Notice 
of Hearing on October 16, 1992 dated July 20, 1*92; (7) Findings of 
Fact Conclusions of Law and Order dated October 19, 1992; (8) 
Abstract of Award dated October 19, 1992; (9) Supplemental Order 
Awarding Attorneys Fees dated November 4, 1992; and (10) Abstract 
of Award dated November 4, 1392* 
The file contains no notice that Mr. Lund was representing the 
respondent in this matter. All notices described above were mailed 
to the respondent at its address in Riverton, Utah and none were 
returned. It is unreasonable for the respondent to assert that 
notice should have been sent to his attorney when no no' Lee of 
representation had been filed with the commission. We believe that 
the respondent had ample notice and opportunity to appear or file 
pleadings in this matter. 
The respondent further claims that the applicant made 
representations that he no longer wished to pursue his claim 
ORDER DENYING 
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against the respondent and that the applicant's representation 
caused the respondent not to file *n answer to the application for 
a hearing. It appears, then that ^he respondent is attempting to 
articulate an estoppel argument in support of granting a new 
hearing. 
A party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on representations or 
acts if they are contrary to his own knowledge of the truth or if 
he had the means by which with reasonable diligence he could 
ascertain the true situation* Coombs v. Ouzounian. 24 Utah 2d 39 t 
465 P.2d 356 (1970); see also Cook v. Cook. 110 Utah 406, 174 P.2d 
434 (lftAfi)* Furthermore/ a determination of the issue of_estoppel 
is not dependent on the subjective state of mind of the person 
claiming he was misled, but rather is to be based on an objective 
test, i.e., what would a reasonable person conclude under the 
circumstances. BjJg__J3utte Ranch, Inc.....v.. Holm, Utah, 570 P.2d 690 
(1977); Corporation Nine v. Tavlor. 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 
(1973). 
The Industrial Commission has no statutory authority to 
provide equitable remedies1, however, even if we had such 
authority we would not find in favor of respondent under these 
circumstances. Applying a reasonable person standard, we find that 
a new heai Ing is not warranted in this case. The respondent 
received notice of all pleadings and hearings in this matter and 
chose to ignora them in deference to the alleged misrepresentations 
of the applic -t. We believe that a reasonable person would make 
further inquii^ with the commission or his attorney if ?1^ received 
net ices regarding a_„jaatter _j\e_ believed had been resolved. 
T refore, the respondent's reliance on the "alleged 
misrepresentations of the applicant was unreasonable. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law 
judge dated November 19, 1992 Is hereby affirmed. 
1 M[T]he Industrial Commission remains a statutorily-created 
ager* y, not a court of equity, is such, the Industrial Commission 
has only those powers expressly or impliedly granted to it by the 
legislature." BayHjs.Vju IndttaAciU^JBfl^ 7 & p- 2 d 573, 576 
(1990); Utah Qonp.j Co. \ .JMwtyi*! COB&S*I, 57 Ut^ ah 118, VJZ P* 
24, 26 (1920). 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the 
Utah Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date of the Order, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53 (2), 35-1-86, 
and 63-46b-16, and Bonded Bicvcle Couriers v. Dent, of Employment 
Security. Case No. 920621-CA (Utah Ct- App. Dec* 4, 1992). The 
requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of 
the hearing for appeals purposes. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Commissioner 
Certified this /Sz£ day of 
AT 
Patricia 0* A s h b y / / 
Commission Secretary
 tjh 
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Salvador Montoya 
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Thomas C. Sturdy, Atty 
UEF 
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S. Harrison, Paralegal 
judication Division 
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James J. Lund 5751 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 West 100 South #710 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 575-8311 ' 199? j IUUL ' 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Salvador D. Montoya 
Applicant 
Pipe Specialties, Inc., 
Defendant 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Judge Donald George 
Defendant moves the Commission, pursuant to Commission Rules and Utah Code 
Ann. Section 35-1-82.52 (1988 Repl. Vol ) to review its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order entered on the 19th day of October 1992. The basis for Defendant's 
motion for Review is as follows: 
1. Applicant is currently and has been in the employ of Defendant subsequent 
to the alleged accident date. 
2. While in the employ of Defendant, Applicant told Defendant he no longer 
wished to pursue a claim against Defendant. 
3. Based on such representations, Defendant did not respond, to Claimant's 
Application, by filing on answer. 
4. Further, Defendant received Notice of Cancellation of Hearing from the 
Commission dated April 2, 1992. 
5. Thereafter, Defendant received no further notice from either the Commission 
or Applicant that any action was still pending against it. 
6. Under such understanding Defendant did not apprise the undersigned of any 
action pending. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH 
Page Two « « 4 ? • 
7. The undersigned has been active in representing Defendant in various legal 
matters including a separate matter before the Commission involving Mr. 
Lester Hunt as applicant. 
8. As counsel for Defendant the undersigned has never received any notice 
concerning Applicant's application. 
Based on the foregoing Defendant seeks a Hearing and Review on the merits of Applicant's 
Application and a reasonable and fair opportunity to consider the evidence put forth by 
AppUcant in Support of the award entered by way at Order by the Commission on October 
19, 1992. 
DATED this 19th day of November, 1992 
OJ. II xu 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No, 91-1181 
SALVADOR D. MONTOYA, * 
* ABSTRACT OF AWARD 
Applicant, * 
* 
vs. * 
* 
PIPE SPECIALTIES, INC. * Judge Donald L. George 
(uninsured). * 
* 
Defendant. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
I hereby certify that on the // *~day of October, 1992, the 
Industrial Commission of Utah made and issued an award in the 
above entitled cause in favor of the applicant, Salvador D. 
Montoya, and against defendant Pipe Specialties, Inc., in the 
above entitled matter. The award was: 
The amount of $ $5,706.01, together with interest at 
the rate of 8% per annum from January 3, 1992, together 
with $935.25 for medical expenses, and all attorneys 
fees and costs incurred in collecting these sums from 
Pipe Specialties, Inc., purusant to UCA §35-1-59. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and the seal 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, thi.s '9^day of October, 
A c.{> 
/v 
, .^  \^L^V2 £f. Donald L. George 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified by the Industrial Commission 
of Uj:ah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
/9c/Jday of October, 1992. 
ATTEST: 
**d± %?*~J O 
Patricia O. Ashb 
Commission Secrelb&xy 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the /^^ciay ot / •C Jr ; ^ <^ ^ , 1992, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order by depositing the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Salvador D. Montoya 
43 62 Highway 28 South 
Las Cruces, NM 84065 
Pipe Specialties, Inc. 
4425 West 12600 South 
Riverton, UT 84 065 
Joyce A. Sewell, Administrator 
Uninsured Employers' Fund 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146612 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612 
Thomas C. Sturdy 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146612 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612 
INDUSTRIAL. COMMISSION OF UTAH 
^ . ^ 
June Harrison, Paralegal 
Adjudication Division 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING* 
I certify that on the /4^' day of / / r y c L- ^ , 1992, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the *!otegoing findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order by depositing the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Salvador D. Montoya 
43 62 Highway 28 South 
Las Cruces, NM 84065 
Pipe Specialties, Inc. 
4425 West 12600 South 
Riverton, UT 84 065 
Joyce A. Sewell, Administrator 
Uninsured Employers' Fund 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146612 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612 
Thomas C. Sturdy 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146612 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612 
INDUSTRIA?u COMMISSION OF UTAH 
/ 
\ 
June Harrisbn, Para"egal 
Adjudication Division 
*/ 
James J. Lund (#5751) 
Attorney for Petitioner^ 
Crandall Building, Suite 710 
10 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 575-8311 
Utah cot. r f 
jcuot ^ 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CierKOiU ib Court 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW 
Case No. 91-1181 
PIPE SPECIALTY, INC, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Respondent Court of Appeals No.. 
Petitioner petitions the Utah Court of Appeals for a Writ of Review of the decision of 
the Adjudication Division of the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, Case No. 91-1181 
in the case entitled Salvador D. Montoya v. Pipe Specialty, Inc., which decision became final May 
3, 1993. This petition seeks respondent to certify the entire record, which shall include all of the 
proceedings and evidence taken in this matter, to the court. This petition seeks review of the 
entire decision. 
Dated this 6th day of June 1993. 
James J. Lund 'y 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Pipe Specialty, Inc. 
MAILING CERTIFIED 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW to the following on this 3rd day of June, 
1993: 
Mr^Benjfimin Sims. General Counsel 
Incfustriaf Commission of Utah 
Adjudication Division 
140 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 11600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
230 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Salvador D. Montoya 
4362 Highway 28 South 
Las Cruces, NM 84065 
<7 (7 
4>-7 ?* 73 
COPY 
JAMES J. LUND #5751 
Suite 710 Crandall Building 
10 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Telephone: (801) 575-8311 
Facsimile: (801) 575-8340 
Attorney for Defendant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ABJUDICATION DIVISION 
SALVADOR MONTOYA, an individual, : 
Plaintiff 
v. : 
PIPE SPECIALTY, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 
Defendant, Pipe Specialty, by and through its counsel, James 
J, Lund, hereby moves the Division to reconsider the Division's 
Order denying review previously sought by Defendant's Motion for 
Review. The basis for this Motion for Reconsideration is as 
follows: 
1. By Defendant's previously filed Motion for Review on or about 
fJpveA^lpor (*/ of 1992, the Division was apprised of the 
undersigned's representation of Defendant. 
1 
2. The Division, through denying Defendant's Motion for Review, 
failed to give notice to the undersigned because it omitted 
the undersigned1s name and address to the mailing or service 
certificate that accompanied the Division's Order dated 
Qa*>\uo+~«/ (f /?9% denying the Defendant's Motion for Review. 
3. In subsequent communication with General Counsel for the 
Industrial Commission, in March of 1993 the undersigned had 
confirmed to him the fact that improper or inadequate notice 
of the Division's Order denying the Defendant's Motion for 
Review had been given. 
4. Because of the inadequate and/or improper and untimely notice 
Defendant's appeal rights from the Division's Order denying 
the Defendant's Motion for Review were obviated. 
5. The appeal time frame began running from the date of the 
Division's Order or ^jZin^^y / /ff} 
6. Defendant and its officers, being out of town on work was not 
apprised of the Division's Order denying Defendant's Motion 
for Review and therefore could not timely notify the 
undersigned of any action by the Division. 
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant, by and through the 
counsel of record, James J. Lund, hereby respectfully submits 
this Motion for Reconsideration. 
DATED this £ — day of April, 1993. 
es J. Lu£ja 
Attorney for Defendant 
&*~*^ 
2 
